Six months after the attack at Pearl Harbor, this was the Japanese Navy's plan for the battle of Midway. This was also exactly what the American Navy planned.

There was one main difference between the two navies' battle plans. While the Japanese plan expected to attack Midway island and then wait for the American aircraft carriers to get there, the American commander knew the Japanese plan in advance, and he decided to already be near Midway when they arrive, and attack them earlier than they expected. This was his secret card against the outnumbering Japanese force.

The critical intelligence

In the few weeks before the battle, the US Navy's Combat Intelligence Office, in charge of analyzing and deciphering Japanese naval radio communications, received indications hinting that the Japanese Navy is preparing for a major attack. Deciphered Japanese messages referred to the attack target only by its code name, AF. There were several possible targets for such a major attack, and knowing which one was code named AF was critical. Commander Joseph P. Rochefort , head of the Combat Intelligence Office, thought that the gathered intelligence indicate that AF is Midway island, but he needed a proof.

In order to prove it, he called Midway via the underwater cable phone line, which the Japanese could not tap, and asked them to transmit a message that the water desalination facility in Midway is broken, a juicy piece of (fake) information for the Japanese intelligence, indicating that the American defenders at Midway are about to suffer a severe shortage of drinking water.

Soon after, Rochefort's staff deciphered a Japanese radio message saying that target AF is suffering a water shortage problem. This was the proof he needed, an extremely important piece of intelligence. It was achieved by a simple trick, but only thanks to the endless prior work of American radio listeners and code breakers.

With this information at hand, Admiral Nimitz, the American commander, could concentrate his entire smaller force in the right place, at the right time, knowing that he knows the enemy's plans, a rare advantage for a commander.

The participating forces

The Japanese fleet was organized in five forces :

• Forward patrol - 16 submarines which advanced ahead of the main force. Their task was to detect the American carriers as soon as possible, and possibly attack them.
• Aircraft carriers - 4 large aircraft carriers commanded by Admiral Nagumo, carrying 250 aircraft and Japan's most experienced naval aviators. Their task was to attack Midway and then to attack the American carriers, once they arrive.
• Invasion force - 12 cargo ships carrying 5000 Japanese Marines, escorted by 2 battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, and many destroyers. Their task was to bring the Japanese Marines to Midway and then provide them with very heavy artillery support.
• Battleships - a mighty force of 7 battleships and a light aircraft carrier. Their task was to intercept the American carriers once they were located, and with their mighty guns sink anything not sunk by the Japanese aircraft.
• Diversion force - 2 light aircraft carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, and 4 large cargo ships carrying Marines. Their task was to attack and invade the Aleutian islands near Alaska in parallel with the attack at Midway.

• Aircraft carriers - 3 aircraft carriers. Enterprise, Hornet, and the quickly repaired Yorktown, escorted by some heavy cruisers and destroyers, which were no match to the Japanese battleships in case of a naval gun battle.
• Midway Island - with 115 fighters and bombers based in it, it was like a stationary but unsinkable aircraft carrier.

The Battle of Midway (June 4th, 1942)

The Japanese aircraft were detected by RADAR and fighters took off from Midway to engage them, but these were too few to prevent the attack, and Midway was bombed for 20 minutes. There was significant damage, and 15 American fighters were shot down, but the runways at Midway were not disabled. About 30 Japanese aircraft were either shot down or severely damaged.

In response, the few American heavy bombers at Midway took off to attack the Japanese aircraft carriers.

At 6am, an American aircraft spotted two of the four Japanese aircraft carriers, and the American carriers were immediately ordered to set course Southwest to intercept them, and to launch their aircraft to attack them.

Admiral Nagumo did not expect the presence of the American aircraft carriers yet, and he did not expect an attack from Midway island after his aircraft heavily bombed it. So he kept very few aircraft on patrol when at about 7am his carriers were attacked by the bombers from Midway island. In response to this attack, Admiral Nagumo decided that the 2nd half of his air group will perform a second attack on Midway. For this purpose, he ordered to rearm his bombers, to replace the torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs with incendiary and fragmentation bombs, more suitable for attacking airfields.

Also at about 7am, the dive bombers and torpedo bombers of the advancing American carriers were launched to attack the Japanese carriers from a long distance of about 300 kilometers. They flew in 6 formations. 3 dive bomber formations, one from each carrier, and 3 torpedo bomber formations, one from each carrier, a total of 116 aircraft touxiang.

While the Japanese second wave was still rearming, a Japanese patrol aircraft spotted the American carriers and reported their position and course, but not that they were aircraft carriers. The surprised Admiral Nagumo re-evaluated the situation for 15 minutes and then ordered to rearm the second attack wave again, back to torpedoes and armor piercing bombs.

At this time, before the second Japanese wave could take off, the aircraft of first Japanese attack wave returned from their attack at Midway and began landing on the Japanese carriers.

At 9am, the Japanese carriers changed course to intercept the incoming American carriers. As a result, the dive bombers from Hornet failed to find the Japanese carriers. But the Japanese carriers were found by the three formations of American torpedo bombers. The American torpedo bombers were not escorted by fighters, and they were engaged by Japanese fighters and anti aircraft guns. They suffered very heavy losses without causing any damage, and all but 8 were shot down.

At 10:24am, when the last American torpedo bomber attack failed, Admiral Nagumo and his men felt lucky and victorious. Their first attack seriously damaged Midway, they were not hit by the heavy bombers from Midway, they were not hit by 3 squadrons of torpedo bombers and shot down most of them, and now they knew of the presence and position of the American carriers, and in a short time, once rearming is completed, they will take off to attack them and win the battle of Midway.

But just two minutes later, at 10:26, the situation was totally different. The fighter patrols which protected the Japanese aircraft carriers were all at low altitude after intercepting the American torpedo bombers, when suddenly 37 Dauntless dive bombers from the Enterprise appeared high above the Japanese carriers, whose flight decks were then full of many fueled and armed bombers ready for take off, making them extremely vulnerable to bomb damage at these moments.

The 37 American dive bombers immediately dived to attack. One group attacked the Japanese carrier Kaga and the other attacked the carrier Akagi, Nagumo's flagship. Only 6 bombs hit, 2 hit Akagi and 4 hit Kaga, but the two aircraft carriers quickly became blazing infernos.

Just a few minutes later, the last American formation, the Yorktown's 17 dive bombers, arrived and attacked a 3rd Japanese carrier, the Soryu. Soryu was hit by 3 bombs and had to be abandoned, it was later sunk by an American submarine.

The short but devastating attack by the American dive bombers was over. Nagumo lost 3 of his 4 aircraft carriers in just a few minutes. He then launched the 40 aircraft from his last carrier, the Hiryu, to attack the American aircraft carriers. The Japanese formation spotted the American carrier Yorktown and attacked it.

Unlike the Japanese fighters, the American fighters protecting the Yorktown were ready and in proper altitude. The Japanese formation suffered very heavy losses by the Yorktown's fighters and anti-aircraft fire, but at least 7 Japanese dive bombers and torpedo bombers were able to attack it. At 14:45pm the Yorktown was hit by 3 bombs and two torpedoes and had to be abandoned. Its dive bombers and fighters landed on Enterprise, and it was later sunk.

The two remaining American aircraft carriers were ordered to launch their dive bombers again, to find and sink the 4th Japanese carrier, which lost most of its aircraft in the attack on the Yorktown. At 15:40pm, 24 dive bombers were launched from Enterprise, and at 5pm they sunk Hiryu with 4 bombs. A while later a Japanese cruiser was sunk by dive bombers from Hornet.

The Japanese force still greatly outnumbered the American force, and initially Admiral Yamamoto wanted to continue the battle, but then he realized that with the loss of the 4 aircraft carriers and their air units, his battleships and the invasion force became too vulnerable to American air attacks. He then decided to retreat his large Armada from Midway. The battle of Midway was over, with a great and decisive American victory.

Results and lessons from the battle of Midway

The aircraft carriers battle of Midway has some lessons:

Intelligence - the American commander knew in advance where and when to expect the Japanese attack and he prepared accordingly.

RADAR - the critical importance of its ability to provide early warning was demonstrated again in Midway. The importance of technology in general was demonstrated.

The importance of air superiority, both in attack and in defense, was also demonstrated.

The importance of professionalism, by everyone :

• The Japanese air observer who spotted the American warships did not further identify them as aircraft carriers. If he did, it was likely to alert Admiral Nagumo, who was then still over confident that he is not yet threatened by aircraft carriers.
• The Japanese bombers bombed Midway for 20 minutes, but did not focus on destroying the runways. If they did, Nagumo would have continued as planned and could immediately launch his second attack wave at the American carriers, and the results could be very different.
• At the moment when the first American carrier-based torpedo bomber was detected, it should have alerted the Japanese that it is most likely part of a coordinated attack, meaning that they should immediately expect carrier-based dive bombers too. After all, this was their own tactic in Pearl Harbor, and it's the obvious tactic. In response, the Japanese should have immediately launched every possible fighter for self defense, keep some fighters at higher altitude instead of letting them all dive down at the torpedo bombers, and immediately clear their full flight decks by immediately launching every aircraft off the deck, regardless of its armament, and taking all the fuel and bombs below deck. If possible, they should have also changed course. Instead, the flight decks of all 4 Japanese carriers remained full of fuel and explosives, while all the fighters which protected them went down to low altitude to intercept the torpedo bombers. The Japanese had time to respond and this could reduce the damage they suffered. If they did, with their numerical advantage they could still make it a Japanese victory.
• The American side had luck, but much of it was thanks to Japanese errors. The American Admiral was aggressive, attacking as soon as possible with everything he could send, while still keeping some defensive patrols, and then attacking again as soon as possible to sink the remaining Japanese carrier.
• The failure of the 16 Japanese submarines in an early warning mission to detect the American carriers presence is a tactical failure. If they detected the American carriers, Nagumo could attack first with his entire air group and win the battle.